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R
ecently the study of optimal monetary policy has shifted from an
analysis of the welfare effects of simple parametric policy rules to
the solution of optimal planning problems. Both approaches evaluate
the welfare effects of monetary policy in an explicit monetary model of the
economy, but they differ in the scope of analysis. The ﬁrst approach is more
restrictive in that it ﬁnds the optimal policy within a class of prespeciﬁed pol-
icy rules for the monetary policy instrument. On the other hand, the second
approach ﬁnds the optimal monetary policy among all allocations that are
consistent with a competitive equilibrium in the monetary economy. Since
monetary policy, in general, does not choose the economy’s allocation but
implements policy through a rule for the policy instruments, it is natural to
ask whether the policy rule implied by the solution to the planning problem
implements the optimal planning allocation. In most work on optimal plan-
ning problems, it is indeed taken for granted that the solution of the planning
problemcanbeimplementedthroughsomepolicyruleforthemonetarypolicy
instrument but, as we show in this article, this need not always be the case.
There is a vast literature on optimal monetary policy that studies the solu-
tion to planning problems. The environments examined are diverse, ranging
from models in which there are no private sector distortions other than an in-
ﬂation tax to models where economies are subject to various types of nominal
rigidities. The policymaker is assumed to choose among all the allocations
that are consistent with a market equilibrium in the given environment. In
addition, different assumptions are made as to whether a policymaker can or
cannot commit to his future choices. Under a full-commitment policy, we as-
Michael Dotsey is with the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Andreas Hornstein is with
the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. The authors thank Andrew Foerster, John Weinberg,
and Alexander Wolman for useful comments. The views expressed in this article are those
of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond or the
Federal Reserve System.
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly Volume 92/2 Spring 2006 113114 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
sume that the policymaker chooses all current and future actions in an initial
period. Alternatively, under time consistency we assume that in every period
a policymaker chooses the optimal action, taking past outcomes as given. For
either speciﬁcation, the solution to the planning problem speciﬁes a rule that
determines the allocation, and part of the allocation is the setting of the policy
instrument.
The question is whether the policy rule implied by the solution to the
planningproblem(oravariationthereof)canimplementtheoptimalallocation
for the planning problem. Speciﬁcally, how would the competitive economy
behave if the monetary authority simply announced the policy rule implied by
the solution to the planning problem? In particular, conditional on the policy
rule, will there be a unique competitive equilibrium?
Giannoni and Woodford (2002a, 2002b) discuss the implementability of
optimalpolicyforlocalapproximationsoftheplanningproblemwithfullcom-
mitment. This starts with a log-linear approximation around the steady state
of the solution to the full-commitment problem. Within the approximation
framework, implementability of the optimal policy rule is equivalent to the
existence and uniqueness of rational expectations equilibria in linear models.
As such, implementability is concerned with “dynamic” uniqueness, that is,
the existence of a unique stochastic process that characterizes the competitive
equilibrium.
King and Wolman (2004) discuss the implementation of Markov-perfect
policy rules for time-consistent solutions to the planning problem. King and
Wolman (2004) show that Markov-perfect policies with an optimal nominal
money stock instrument can imply equilibrium indeterminacy at two levels.
First, it can imply multiple steady states. Second, around each steady state
it can imply static price level indeterminacy, that is, conditional on future
outcomes there can be multiple current equilibrium prices.
In this article, we review implementability of both the optimal
full-commitmentandtime-consistentMarkov-perfectmonetarypolicieswhen
the policymaker uses a nominal money stock instrument. We study optimal
policy in a simple New Keynesian economic model as described in Wolman
(2001)andKingandWolman(2004). Weﬁrstcharacterizethesolutiontoalin-
earized version of the ﬁrst-order conditions (FOCs) of the planning problems.
We show that optimal monetary policy locally implements the planning allo-
cation for the full-commitment and the Markov-perfect case. We then study
whether the policy rules implement the planning allocations globally. We re-
viewKingandWolman’s(2004)argumentthattheMarkov-perfectpolicyrule
cannot implement the planning allocation. Finally, we provide a partial argu-
ment that the full-commitment policy rule globally implements the planning
allocation.M. Dotsey andA. Hornstein: Monetary Policy Implementation 115
1. A SIMPLE ECONOMY WITH STICKY PRICES
Weinvestigatethequestionoftheimplementabilityofoptimalmonetarypolicy
within the conﬁnes of a simple New Keynesian economic model. The model
contains an inﬁnitely lived representative household with preferences over
consumptionandleisure. Theconsumptiongoodisproducedusingaconstant-
returns-to-scale technology with a continuum of differentiated intermediate
goods. Eachintermediategoodisproducedbyamonopolisticallycompetitive
ﬁrm with labor as the only input. Intermediate goods ﬁrms set the nominal
price for their products for two periods, and an equal share of intermediate




The representative household’s utility is a function of consumption, ct, and




βt [lnct − χnt], (1)
where χ ≥ 0, and 0 <β<1. The household’s period budget constraint is
Ptct + Bt+1 + Mt ≤ Wtnt + Rt−1Bt + Mt−1 + Dt + Tt, (2)
where Pt (Wt) is the money price of consumption (labor), Bt+1 (Mt+1) are the
end-of-period holdings of nominal bonds (money), Rt−1 is the gross nominal
interestrateonbonds, Tt arelump-sumtransfers, andDt isproﬁtincomefrom
ﬁrms owned by the representative household. The household is assumed to
hold money in order to pay for consumption purchases
Mt = Ptct. (3)
We will use the term “real” to denote nominal variables deﬂated by the price
of consumption goods, and we use lower-case letters to denote real variables.
For example, real balances are m ≡ M/P.
The FOCs of the representative household’s problem are










Equation (4) states that the marginal utility derived from the real wage equals
the marginal disutility from work. Equation (5) is the Euler equation, which
states that if the real rate of return increases, then the household increases
future consumption relative to today’s consumption.116 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Firms
The consumption good is produced using a continuum of differentiated inter-
mediate goods as inputs to a constant-returns-to-scale technology. Producers
of the consumption good behave competitively in their markets. There is a
measure one of intermediate goods, indexed j ∈ [0,1]. Production of the







where ε>1. Given nominal prices, P (j), for the intermediate goods, the







For a given level of production, the cost-minimizing demand for intermediate
good j depends on the good’s relative price, p(j) ≡ P(j)/P,
yt(j) = pt (j)
−ε ct. (8)
Each intermediate good is produced by a single ﬁrm, and j indexes both
the ﬁrm and good. Firm j produces y(j) units of its good using a constant-
returns technology with labor as the only input,
yt(j) = ξtnt(j), (9)
and ξt is a positive iid productivity shock with mean one. Each ﬁrm behaves
competitively in the labor market and takes wages as given. Real marginal
cost in terms of consumption goods is
ψt = wt/ξt. (10)
Since each intermediate good is unique, intermediate goods producers
have some monopoly power, and they face downward sloping demand curves,
(8). Intermediate goods producers set their nominal price for two periods, and






















Since the ﬁrm is owned by the representative household, the household’s
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution is used to discount future proﬁts.
Usingthedeﬁnitionoftheﬁrm’sdemandfunction,(8),theﬁrst-ordercondition





















with μ = ε/(ε − 1).
A Symmetric Equilibrium
We will assume a symmetric equilibrium, that is, all ﬁrms who face the same
constraints behave the same. Each period, half of all ﬁrms have the option to
adjust their nominal price. This means that in every period there will be two
ﬁrm types: the ﬁrms who adjust their nominal price in the current period, type
0 ﬁrms with relative price p0, and the ﬁrms who adjusted their price in the last
period, type 1 ﬁrms with current relative price p1.
Conditional on a description of monetary policy, the equilibrium of the
economy is completely described by the sequence of marginal cost, relative
prices, inﬂation rates, nominal interest rates, aggregate output, and real bal-
ances {ψt,p 0,t,p 1,t,πt,R t,c t,m t} such that (3), and













































Equation (13) uses the optimal labor supply condition (4) in the deﬁnition of
marginal cost (10). Equation (14) is the price index equation (7) and equation
(15)istheproﬁtmaximizationcondition(12)forthetwoﬁrmtypes. Equation
(16) just restates how next period’s preset relative price p1,t+1 is related to the
relative price that is set in the current period, p0,t, through the inﬂation rate
πt+1. Finally, equation (17) is the household’s Euler equation, (5).
Distortions
AllocationsinthiseconomyarenotPareto-optimalbecauseoftwodistortions.
The ﬁrst distortion results from the monopolistically competitive structure of
intermediategoodsproductions: thepriceofanintermediategoodisnotequal







. The second distortion reﬂects inefﬁcient production when relative
pricesaredifferentfromone. Usingtheexpressionsfortheproductionofﬁnal
goods and the demand functions for intermediate goods, (6) and (8), we can
obtain the total demand for labor as a function of relative prices and aggregate
output. Solving aggregate labor demand for aggregate output, we obtain an
“aggregate” production function










Given the symmetric production structure, equations (6) and (9), efﬁcient
production requires that equal quantities of each intermediate good are pro-
duced. Allocational efﬁciency is reﬂected in the term dt ≥ 1. The allocation
is efﬁcient if p0,t = p1,t = dt = 1.




ity with the characterization of the aggregate production function (18) yields
equilibrium work effort
nt = dtψt/χ. (19)















after dropping any constant or additive exogenous terms.
2. MONETARY POLICY
Sincetheallocationoftheabove-describedmonopolisticallycompetitiveequi-
librium with sticky prices is suboptimal, there is the potential for welfare-
improving policy interventions. In view of the role of nominal rigidities, we
want to characterize optimal monetary policy. In particular, we want to know
how optimal monetary policy can be implemented given some choice of pol-
icy instrument. We examine the implications of choosing the nominal money
stock as the policy instrument. This is the policy instrument considered in
King and Wolman (2004), where they assume that the policymaker chooses
a sequence for the nominal money stock {Mt}. Alternatively the policymaker
couldselectthenominalinterestrate, Rt, asthepolicyinstrument. Thechoice
of policy instrument can be crucial for questions of the implementability of
optimal monetary policy, and we will get back to this issue in the conclusion.
For the analysis of the monetary policy planning problem, it is convenient
to deﬁne monetary policy in terms of the money stock normalized relative toM. Dotsey andA. Hornstein: Monetary Policy Implementation 119





rather than the nominal money stock, Mt, directly. This normalization is not
restrictive for the analysis of a policymaker that can commit to future policy






ct = p1,tm1t. (22)
Optimal Monetary Policy
Theobjectiveofmonetarypolicyiswell-deﬁned: thepolicymakeristochoose
an allocation that maximizes the representative household’s utility subject to
theconstraintthattheallocationcanbesupportedasacompetitiveequilibrium.
Foroursimpleexample,anyallocationthatsatisﬁesequations(13)–(16),(18),









= 0 for t ≥ 0. (23)
The vector xt = (yt,z t) contains the private sector variables,
yt =

p0,t,p 1,t,πt,ψt,d t,c t


, and the policy instrument, zt = m1t.1 For-












= 0 for t ≥ 0, (24)
where u denotes the period utility function of the representative household as
deﬁned in equation (20). A solution to this problem will have xt as a function
of the current and past state of the economy.
We will solve two alternative versions of the planning problem. First, we
assume that the policymaker at time zero chooses once and for all the optimal
allocationamongallfeasibleallocationsthatcanbesupportedasacompetitive
equilibrium. This approach delivers the constrained optimal allocation, but
frequently the chosen allocation is not time consistent. The allocation is not
time consistent in the sense that if a policymaker gets the option to reconsider
hischoicesaftersometime, hewouldwanttodeviatefromtheinitiallychosen
1 The characterization of the private sector involves equilibrium prices and quantities. With
some abuse of standard terminology, we will call the vector y the equilibrium allocation.120 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
path. The alternative approach then ﬁnds optimal time-consistent monetary
policies. In particular, we will restrict attention to Markov-perfect policy
rules, that is, rules that make policy choices contingent on payoff-relevant
state variables only.
For the planning problem, we are not speciﬁc about how the policymaker
can implement the policy: we simply assume that the policymaker can se-
lect any allocation subject to the constraint that the allocation is consistent
with a competitive equilibrium allocation. We will say that a policy can be
implemented if a unique rational expectations equilibrium exists when the
policymaker sets the policy instrument, zt, according to the state-contingent
rule implied by the planning problem.
Optimal Policy with Full Commitment
Suppose that at time zero the policymaker chooses a sequence {xt} for the
market allocation and the policy instrument that solves problem (24). We
assume that the policymaker is committed to this outcome for all current and
future values of the market outcome and the instrument. The FOCs for this
constrained maximization problem are























for t = 0. (26)
Note that the FOC for the initial time period, t = 0, is essentially the same as
theFOCsforfuturetimeperiods,t>0,ifweassumethatthelaggedLagrange
multiplier in the initial time period is zero, λ−1 = 0. This simply means that
in the initial time period, the policymaker’s choices are not constrained by
past market expectations of outcomes in the initial period.
MarcetandMarimon(1998)showhowtorewritetheplanningproblemas
a recursive saddlepoint problem such that dynamic programming techniques
can be applied. Following their approach, the Lagrange multiplier, λt−1, can
be interpreted as a state that reﬂects the past commitments of the planner.
Given the dynamic programming formulation, the optimal policy choice will















the particular status of the initial period. If a policymaker gets the opportunity
to reevaluate his choices at some time t  > 0, then equation (25) will no
longer characterize the optimal decision at t . Rather equation (26) will apply
at the time t , and, in general, the policymaker would want to deviate from
his original decision. If the policymaker has no way to precommit to future
policy actions, the optimal policy will therefore not be time consistent.M. Dotsey andA. Hornstein: Monetary Policy Implementation 121
Markov-Perfect Optimal Policy
Westudyaparticularclassoftime-consistentpolicies,namelyMarkov-perfect
policies. For a Markov-perfect policy, the optimal policy rule is restricted to
dependonpayoff-relevantstatevariablesonly,thatis,predeterminedvariables
that constrain the attainable allocations of the economy. We can think of
today’s policymaker as taking his own future actions as given by a policy rule
thatmakeshischoicescontingentonthefuturepayoff-relevantstatevariables.
Given these future choices, the policymaker’s optimal choice for today will
then also depend on payoff-relevant state variables only.
In our environment, predetermined nominal prices do not constrain the
policymakers’ choices among the allocations that are consistent with a com-
petitiveequilibrium. Eventhoughthenominalpricesetbyaﬁrmthatadjusted
its price in the last period, P1,t, is predetermined, the relevant variable is that
ﬁrm’s relative price, p1,t, which is not predetermined. Since the predeter-
mined nominal price is not payoff-relevant, the policymaker has to choose the
nominalmoneystockinawaysuchthatthepredeterminednominalpricecan-
not affect outcomes. But this just means that the policymaker cannot choose
the nominal money stock, Mt, but has to choose the normalized money stock,
m1t.
Our environment as described by (23) then has the feature that, except for
the exogenous shocks, ξt, there are no predetermined variables that constrain
theequilibriumallocation. Inotherwords,inanytimeperiodthevaluesforthe
variables that characterize the competitive equilibrium have to be consistent
with future values of the same variables, but the variables can be chosen
independently of any values they took in the past.
In a Markov-perfect equilibrium, the current policymaker then assumes







, for t  >t. For this reason, current policy choices have no effect on











































2 In general, the FOCs for a Markov-perfect optimal policy are different from the initial
period FOCs for an optimal policy with full commitment. If there are endogenous state variables,
then even with Markov-perfect optimal policies, a policymaker can inﬂuence future policy choices
by changing next period’s state variables and thereby affecting the constraint set of next period’s
policymaker.122 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Implementability of Optimal Policy
If the only requirement for feasible monetary policy is the consistency with a
competitiveequilibrium,thenthereisnoreasontodistinguishbetweenprivate
sector choices, yt, and the policy instrument, zt. We might as well assume
that the policymaker chooses both variables, xt, subject to the consistency
requirements. Now suppose that the outcome of the optimization problem is
a policy rule that speciﬁes choices for the instrument and the private sector
allocationcontingentonoutcomesthatmayincludethecurrentandpaststates
of the economy
zt = gzt (·) and yt = gxt (·). (29)
A somewhat narrower deﬁnition of what constitutes a feasible monetary pol-
icy not only requires that the allocations implied by g are consistent with a
competitive equilibrium, but also requires that, conditional on the rule for the
policyinstrument,gz,therulefortheprivatesectorallocation,gy,istheunique






yt+1,g z,t+1 (·),y t,g zt (·);ξt+1,ξt


= 0 for t ≥ 0. (30)
If we cannot ﬁnd a unique solution, gy, to this dynamic system, then we say
thattheoptimalpolicycannotbeimplementedsincetheassociatedcompetitive
equilibrium is indeterminate.
In the case of full-commitment policy rules, we can consider an expanded
version of the planner’s policy rule. Suppose that the planner can respond
contemporaneously to deviations of the competitive equilibrium allocation
from the allocation implied by the full-commitment policy rule. Then we can























whereH (0) = 0. SincethechoiceofthefunctionH isarbitrary,exceptforthe
originnormalization,itthenappearsthat,underthesecircumstances,aplanner
can always implement the full-commitment solution. Note that a Markov-
perfectpolicyrulecannotbeaugmentedinthiswaysincethecontemporaneous
private sector allocation is not a payoff-relevant state variable.
3. LOCAL PROPERTIES OF OPTIMAL POLICY
We now discuss the local dynamics of full-commitment and Markov-perfect
optimal policy for our simple economy from Section 1. We derive necessary
conditions for the optimal policy and characterize the deterministic steady
state of the economy for the types of policy. We then study the properties of
optimalpolicyforalocalapproximationarounditssteadystate. Ourapproach
follows King andWolman (1999) and Khan, King, andWolman (2003) in that
we study the dynamics of a linear approximation to the FOCs and constraintsM. Dotsey andA. Hornstein: Monetary Policy Implementation 123
of the optimal planning problem.3 The two optimal policies imply differ-
ent policy rules for a money stock instrument. We show that for the local
approximation, both implied that policy rules implement a unique rational
expectations equilibrium.
Consider a policymaker who uses the money supply as an instrument,
that is, the policymaker chooses the money stock according to equation (21).
We can then write the competitive equilibrium conditional on the instrument
choice in terms of the variables yt = p1,t and zt = m1t. Conditional on the
relative preset price and the policy instrument, consumption is determined by
(22); the relative ﬂexible price is determined by (14); allocational efﬁciency
is determined by (18); and marginal cost is determined by (13) and (22).
The nominal interest rate is determined residually from equation (17). The


















and the FOC for proﬁt maximization (15) corresponds to the dynamic con-





























Optimal Policy with Full Commitment
Under full commitment, the policymaker maximizes the value function (31)






















3Another common approach to the analysis of optimal monetary policy starts with a linear-
quadratic approximation of the planning problem, e.g., Giannoni and Woodford (2002a, 2002b).
For this alternative approach, one obtains a quadratic approximation of the objective function and
a linear approximation of the constraints around the steady state of the planning problem and
then solves the linear-quadratic (LQ) optimization problem. In general, the results from the two
approaches will differ since the LQ approach does not use the second-order terms in the constraint
functions, whereas the approach that linearizes the ﬁrst-order conditions does use this information.
Recently, Benigno and Woodford (2005) have shown how to modify the LQ problem such that



































(34) denotes the FOC with respect to the relative price, p1.
The Deterministic Steady State of the Full-Commitment
Policy
In the deterministic steady state of the full-commitment policy, there is zero
inﬂation (King and Wolman 1999; Wolman 2001). We can easily verify that
π = p0 = p1 = d = 1isindeedadeterministicsteadystateofequations(32),
(33), and (34). Combining equation (13) with the monetary policy equation
(22) yields an expression that relates marginal cost to real balances and the
preset relative price
ψ = χm1p1. (35)
We can substitute this expression for marginal cost in the FOC for proﬁt
maximization of price-adjusting ﬁrms, (32), and, using the deﬁnition of the





1/π + βπε−1. (36)
Thus conditional on no inﬂation, πFC = 1, real balances are mFC
1 = 1/(χμ),
and marginal cost is ψFC = 1/μ. Substituting for marginal cost in the FOC
for real balances (33) yields the steady state value for the Lagrange multiplier
λFC = (1 − 1/μ)/2, and the FOC for preset relative prices, (34), is satisﬁed.
Local Properties of the Full-Commitment Solution
First, we show that the solution to the full-commitment problem stabilizes the
prices in response to productivity shocks (King and Wolman 1999). Second,
we show that the full-commitment policy rule implements the competitive
equilibrium. In the following, let a hat denote the percentage deviation of a
variable from its steady state value.
The log-linear approximation of equations (32), (33) and (34) around the
no-inﬂation steady state for t>0 are
0=2 ˆ p1t+
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ˆ p1t+[1+χ (μ − 1)]

ˆ m1t − ˆ ξt

+(μ − 1) ˆ λt. (39)M. Dotsey andA. Hornstein: Monetary Policy Implementation 125
Wesolvethislineardifferenceequationsystemthroughthemethodofundeter-
minedcoefﬁcients. Giventhestructureoftheequationsystem,itisreasonable
to guess that the only relevant state variable is the lagged Lagrange multiplier,
λt−1, and that the solution is of the form
ˆ m1t − ˆ ξt = γ ˆ λt−1, ˆ p1t = θ ˆ λt−1, and ˆ λt = ωˆ λt−1 for t>0. (40)
Now substitute these expressions in equations (37)–(39) and conﬁrm that they
solve the difference equation system. This procedure yields three equations
that can be solved for the unknowns (ω,γ,ρ).
The optimal full-commitment policy increases normalized real balances
m1 with productivity shocks such that relative prices are not affected, (40).
Relativepricesrespondtopastcommitmentsofthepolicymakerasreﬂectedin
the Lagrange multiplier λ, and the Lagrange multiplier evolves independently
of productivity shocks. When the Lagrange multiplier attains its steady state
value it stays there and optimal policy from thereon ﬁxes the price level and
relative prices. We do not prove it, but for reasonable numerical values of
(β,μ,χ) the coefﬁcient ω is negative but less than one in absolute value, that
is, the system oscillates, but it is stable. In Figure 1 we graph the transitional
dynamics of the economy for some parameter values that are standard for
quantitativeeconomicanalysis,β = 0.99,μ = 1.1,andχ = 1. Aswecansee,
all variables display dampened oscillations around their steady state values.
As discussed above, the FOCs for the initial period of the full-commitment
problemareequivalenttotheFOCs(38)and(39)withλ−1 = 0, thatis, ˆ λ−1 =
−1. Thus during a transition period, as the Lagrange multiplier converges to
its steady state value, relative prices change in proportion to the value of the
Lagrange multiplier.
The money-supply policy rule, deﬁned as the ﬁrst and third expression in
(40), implements the optimal allocation as a competitive equilibrium. To see
this, substitute the policy rule into the log-linear approximation of the optimal








For a Markov-perfect optimal monetary policy, the policymaker at time t
maximizes the value function (31) subject to the constraints (32), assuming
that future policy choices are some function of the future exogenous shock.
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(43) denotes the FOC with respect to the relative price, p1.
The Deterministic Steady State of the Markov-Perfect Policy
The deterministic steady state of the Markov-perfect equilibrium has positive
inﬂation, as opposed to the steady state of the full-commitment solution. It
is straightforward to show that optimal policy does not stabilize prices in the
steady state. Suppose to the contrary that there is no inﬂation in the steady
state, p0 = p1 = 1, then evaluating equations (32), (42), and (43) at their






















the impact of p1 on allocational efﬁciency is negative. This suggests that the
steady state inﬂation rate is positive, as indeed shown byWolman (2001). We
can ﬁnd the steady state inﬂation rate as the solution to the following ﬁx-point
problem. Conditionalonsomeinﬂationrate, π,useequations(35)and(36)to
determinesteadystaterealbalances,m1,andmarginalcost,ψ. Conditionalon
(π,m1,ψ), use equation (42) to obtain the steady state Lagrange multiplier
λ. Finally, we have to verify that equation (43) is satisﬁed.
The competitive equilibrium constraint (32), together with the FOCs for
optimal policy, (42) and (43), evaluated at their deterministic steady state






however, that contingent on the steady state Markov-perfect real balances
mMP
1 , the competitive equilibrium constraint alone is consistent with multiple
steady states. In Figure 2, we graph real balances as a function of the inﬂation
rate, π, based on equation (36). Notice that as the inﬂation rate increases, real
balances ﬁrst increase and then decline. This means that for a given choice of
real balances that is not too high, m1 >m FC
1 = 1/(χμ), there are two steady
state inﬂation rates.128 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Local Properties of the Markov-Perfect Policy
For a local approximation of the optimal Markov-perfect policy we can show
that the policy stabilizes prices around the trend growth path in response to
productivity shocks. Because the steady state involves positive inﬂation, the
expressions for the local approximations are quite convoluted, and we do not
display them here. Sufﬁce it to say that locally the optimal Markov-perfect
solution is of the form
ˆ p1t =ˆ m1t − ˆ ξt = ˆ λt = 0. (45)
We can substitute the local approximation of the Markov-perfect policy rule,
second and third equalities of (45), into the log-linear approximation of the





(ε − 1)(1 − μχm1)πε







side term is zero. Since the steady state of the Markov-perfect equilibrium
involves only a very small amount of inﬂation, the coefﬁcient on future prices
isclosetozeroandcertainlylessthanone. Thus, solvingtheequationforward
implies that there exists a unique REE, ˆ p1t = 0.
4. GLOBAL PROPERTIES OF OPTIMAL POLICY
We now show that the policy rule implied by a Markov-perfect optimal policy
doesnotgloballyimplementtheoptimalpolicyallocation. Wealsoconjecture
that the policy rule implied by the full-commitment policy may not always be
implementable. An augmented full-commitment policy rule that can respond
to contemporaneous variables as described in Section 2, however, is likely to
implement the optimal policy allocation.
For the analysis of the global properties of policy rules, it will be use-
ful to rewrite a ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximization condition (12), which represents
the competitive equilibrium constraint for the planning problem. Solve this
expression for a ﬁrm’s optimal relative price as a markup over the average














We can think of this expression as a ﬁrm’s optimal relative price choice on
the left-hand side, p0t, conditional on the relative prices set by all other ﬁrms,
¯ p0t, determiningtheright-handsideoftheequation. Thebehavioroftheother
ﬁrms is reﬂected in the equilibrium values of marginal cost and the inﬂationM. Dotsey andA. Hornstein: Monetary Policy Implementation 129
rate. Forourargument,wewillassumethattherearenoshockstotheeconomy,
that is, productivity is constant. Using the equilibrium conditions (13), (16),

























We can verify that (49) is the optimal response to productivity shocks by
substituting the expression for m1t into equations (32), (42), and (43). This
policy rule reﬂects the deﬁnition of a Markov-perfect policy: it depends only
on payoff-relevant state variables, that is, ξt only in our case.
In general, the Markov-perfect policy rule cannot implement the planning
allocation as a competitive equilibrium outcome. King and Wolman (2004)
argue that a Markov-perfect optimal policy introduces strategic complemen-
tarities into the ﬁrms’price-setting behavior and thereby makes multiple equi-
libria possible. With constant normalized real balances of the Markov-perfect
















Strategic complementarities are said to be present if a representative ﬁrm
increasesitsowncontrolvariablewhenitperceivesthatallotherﬁrmsincrease
their control variable. In terms of the price-setting equation (50): a ﬁrm
increases its own relative price, p0t, on the left-hand side of the expression
if all other ﬁrms increase their relative price, ¯ p0t, on the right-hand side of
the expression. Essentially, if all other ﬁrms increase their price, ¯ p0t, then
the expected inﬂation rate increases, and therefore a ﬁrm will increase its own
relative price in order to prevent an erosion of its relative price in the next
period. Since the equilibrium relative price is a ﬁx-point of expression (50),
p0t =¯ p0t, strategic complementarities raise the possibility of multiple ﬁxed
points, that is, multiple equilibria.
In Figure 3 we graph the RHS of (50), conditional on some value
for p1,t+1. If we evaluate the RHS of (50) at ¯ p0t = 1, we get p0t = 1 and
RHS = μχmMP
1 > 1. If we consider the limit of the RHS as ¯ p0t becomes
arbitrarily large, we see that ¯ p1t converges to a ﬁnite value and the inﬂation









origin with slope μχmMP
1 > 1. Without a further analysis of the behavior of
theRHSforﬁnitepositivevaluesof ¯ p0t,thisatleastsuggeststhepossibilityof
two intersection points of the RHS with the diagonal. Furthermore we know
that in the steady state, when p1,t+1 = pMP
1 , there are indeed two solutions
for p0 to equation (36). King andWolman (2004) show that, in general, there
exist two intersection points. Thus there is no unique equilibrium and the
Markov-perfect policy rule does not implement the planning allocation.
Full-Commitment Policy
Optimal full-commitment monetary policy stabilizes prices in response to
productivity shocks not only locally around the steady state, but also globally,
m1t =˜ m1tξt, ˜ m1 =   (λt−1), p1t =  (λt−1), and λt =  (λt−1). (51)
To see this, simply note that equations (32), (33), and (34) deﬁne a system in
( ˜ m1t,p 1t,λ t−1) that is independent of productivity shocks. Different from the
Markov-perfectpolicy,theLagrangemultiplieronthecompetitiveequilibrium
constraint is not constant and therefore the normalized real balances are not
constant.
Wedonothaveunambiguousresultsontheimplementationoftheplanning
allocation through the full-commitment policy rule. On the one hand, we
can show that if the Lagrange multiplier has attained its steady state value,
λt−1 = λFC, then the full-commitment policy rule implements the planningM. Dotsey andA. Hornstein: Monetary Policy Implementation 131
solution. Ontheotherhand,aslongastheLagrangemultiplierhasnotattained
itssteadystate,thefull-commitmentpolicyrulesuffersfromsomeofthesame
problems as does the Markov-perfect policy.
Suppose that the Lagrange multiplier has attained its steady state value,
λt−1 = λFC. IfwesubstitutethevaluefortheLagrangemultiplierintheFOCs
(33) and (34), we can see that they will always be satisﬁed from there on. But
this means that from there on the normalized real balances attain their steady
state value, mFC










Therefore p1t = p0t, that is P FC
t = P FC
t−1, and prices are determined.
Now consider the transitional phase when the Lagrange multiplier differs
fromitssteadystatevalue. Giventheimpliedpolicyrule(51),wecanconstruct
future nominal money stocks recursively as functions of the initial value of
the Lagrange multiplier



















With full commitment, a policymaker can always announce a time path for
the nominal money supply and follow through on that announcement. Given
the nominal money supply rule, we can rewrite the optimal pricing condition
(48) in nominal terms and get
P0t = μχ
Mt + βMt+1 (Pt+1/Pt)
ε−1



















As we do for the analysis of the Markov-perfect policy, we are looking for
a ﬁx point in the optimal nominal price, P0t, conditional on the past and
future nominal prices, P0,t−1 and P0,t+1, and the nominal money stocks, Mt
and Mt+1. Clearly for a constant money supply, that is, the constant steady
state Lagrange multiplier, there is a unique solution for P0t. If the Lagrange
multiplierconvergesgloballytoitssteadystate, thenifthedifferencebetween
Mt and Mt+1 is small enough, we will also have a unique solution. We do
not, however, prove that there is a unique solution for the initial phase of the
transition period.
Note that for full-commitment policy, we have only outlined the same
potential for multiple equilibria as King and Wolman (2004) have shown to
exist for the Markov-perfect policy rule. We have not proven that the full-
commitment policy rule cannot implement the planning allocation. Whether
or not the full-commitment policy rule implements the planning allocation132 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
may be irrelevant if one believes that a policymaker can always respond to
contemporaneous variables. If such a response is feasible, then an augmented




commitment and time-consistent Markov-perfect planning problems. The so-
lutions are consistent with rational expectations competitive equilibria. The
optimalsolutiontotheplanningproblemimpliesarulefortheassumedpolicy
instrument, in our case, a money supply instrument. We have then veriﬁed
that, for local approximations to the solution of the optimal policy problem,
the implied policy rules implement the planning allocations, that is, the plan-
ning allocation is the unique rational expectations equilibrium conditional on
the implied policy rule. However, following on the insights of King and Wol-
man (2004), we have then examined whether the implied policy rules also
implement the allocation globally. We ﬁnd that a money supply rule that is
Markov-perfect does not implement the planning solution. We provide a par-
tialargumentthatthefull-commitmentmoneysupplyruledoesimplementthe
planning solution, but we do not have a complete proof for this statement.
For the analysis, we have taken the choice of monetary instrument, in this
case the nominal money stock, as given but this choice is not innocuous. In
other work (Dotsey and Hornstein 2005), we have argued that equilibrium
indeterminacy may depend on the choice of policy instrument. In particular,
if the Markov-perfect policy uses the nominal interest rate as an instrument,
the equilibrium is determinate.
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